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1.  Introduction 
 
The post-war economy of the world is characterized by liberalization of many of the 
restrictions imposed by the governments on the movements of goods and capital across 
countries. Through several rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, regional 
cooperation, and unilateral trade liberalization of many countries, the world had seen 
rapid dismantling of trade barriers and the resulting surge in international trade volumes, 
capital flows, and national income levels. 
 
The rise of the Chinese economy after its decision to open up its economy to 
foreign trade and foreign direct investment at the end of the seventies had created one of 
the biggest shocks to the world economy. The shock was not only due to the size of the 
Chinese economy, but also because of the impressive and nearly uninterrupted growth 
rates of its economy in the past twenty some years. It has become the biggest destination 
of foreign direct investment among all developing countries, and it is now ranked the 
third largest trading country in the world.  
 
Recently two economic events concerning China had drawn a lot of attention of 
the government planners and economists of many countries. The first is China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in November 2001.
1 Being a new 
member of this organization, China is required to make changes in many of its trade 
policies. In particular, it has to substantially lower its tariffs, lower its restriction on the 
inflow of capital into some of the sectors, and change many of its corporate taxes on 
foreign investors. 
 
The second event is that China and ASEAN signed a framework free trade 
agreement in November 2002. They recently agreed to form a free trade area (FTA) in 
ten years.
2 Because of the agreement, China and ASEAN will remove nearly all the 
restrictions on movement of goods between ASEAN and China. Japan and South Korea 
also expressed great interest in forming free trade areas with ASEAN. 
 
Based on the performance of the China economy in the past twenty-four years, it 
is widely expected that China’s accession to the WTO and the establishment of China-
ASEAN FTA will bring big and extensive changes to their economies and to the rest of 
the world. These changes will certainly benefit some countries and people, but will 
unavoidably hurt the welfare of some countries and people. 
 
Concerns about possible adverse impacts of these two events had been raised. 
For example, it has been worried that when China becomes a member of the WTO, trade 
liberalization will greatly improve the competitiveness of Chinese products in the world 
markets, and its economy will become much more attractive to foreign direct investment. 
                                                 
1 China formally became a member of the WTO on January 1, 2002. 
2 ASEAN decided back in 1992 to convert itself into a free trade area.   2
It is further worried that the success of the Chinese trade performance could be at the 
expense of the AEASN economies. That is because ASEAN products could lose market 
shares in third countries such as the United States, and because China could attract some 
foreign capital which was originally supposed to be sent to ASEAN. 
 
To examine and analyze some of these worries, Wong (2004) investigates some 
of the features of trade between China and some of the ASEAN member nations.
3 He 
does not find evidence to support the worry that ASEAN products will lose out to 
Chinese products in other countries such as the United States. Instead, he argues that the 
existence of significant intra-industry trade could bring good potential gains to all 
countries concerned. Wong (2003) builds a theoretical three-country model to analyze 
the impacts of trade liberalization by China on welfare of China, ASEAN and the rest of 
the world. He derives conditions under which the ASEAN could gain from China’s 
accession to the WTO. 
 
This paper is another attempt to investigate the impacts of trade liberalization by 
China. Contrary to the previous work of Wong, this paper examines not only China’s 
accession to the WTO, but also the formation of a China-ASEAN FTA. How these two 
forms of trade liberalization by China may affect international trade, international 
capital movement, commodity and factor prices, and welfare will be analyzed. 
 
This paper will construct a two-good, multi-variety, and three-country model. 
The countries are conveniently called China, ASEAN, and ROW (the rest of the world), 
while the two goods are manufacturing and agriculture. ROW in fact consists of eight 
countries/economies: the USA, Japan, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, and 
Hong Kong. We allow differentiation of products and the existence of internal 
economies of scale. Thus our model is suitable for analyzing both inter-industry trade 
and intra-industry trade among the countries. Another feature of the present model is 
that capital movement is allowed. We will investigate the impacts of trade liberalization 
on the movement of goods and capital movement. 
 
We start with a theoretical model. The model is very extensive and capable of 
capturing many of the issues of interest. The cost of building such a model is that it is so 
complicated that analyzing the possible impacts of a shock, such as a reduction in tariff 
rates, is very difficult. Therefore in the second half of the paper, we solve the system 
assuming various government policies and compare the equilibria of the three-country 
model to examine how some of the endogenous variables may be affected. We will 
investigate the features of the following cases: 
(a) The benchmark. This is the case before China’s accession to the WTO.  
(b) Scenario 1: This is the case in which China is a member of the WTO but before the 
China-ASEAN FTA. 
                                                 
3 Wong (2004) investigates the trade between China and the following five ASEAN members: Singapore, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.   3
(c) Scenario 2: This is the case in which China is a member of the WTO, and China and 
ASEAN forms an FTA. However, the China-ASEAN FTA does not include 
liberalization in capital movement. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the three-
country model. Section 3 presents the benchmark and some of the assumptions used in 
the simulation. Section 4 analyzes the case in which China is a member of the WTO. 
Sections 5 investigates scenario 2, with China and ASEAN forming an FTA (and also 
with China being a member of the WTO). The last section concludes. 
 
 
2.  A Three-Country Model 
 
The model used in the present paper consists of two sectors with differentiated products, 
three (groups of) countries, and four factors (labor and three types of capital). The two 
sectors are manufacturing (m) and agriculture (a).
4 In each sector, there are a large 
number of monopolistically competitive firms, each of which employs labor and capital 
to produce a variety of the product. Free entry and exit ensures zero product of each firm 
in the long run. 
 
The three countries or groups of countries/regions are China (c), ASEAN (a), 
and ROW (r). ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, is a group of 
countries, but in the present paper, they are combined together and treated as a country. 
ROW, or the rest of the world, consists of USA, Japan, Australia, Canada, UK, Italy, 
France, Germany, and Hong Kong. These eight countries/regions are the most important 
trading partners of China and ASEAN.  
 
Labor is a homogeneous factor, which is perfectly mobile within a country but 
immobile between countries. Each country possesses a special type of capital, which can 
move within and between countries. Subject to all relevant factor prices considered in 
the present paper, certain amounts of each type of capital move to the other countries so 
that each firm in any country will have the chance to employ all three different types of 
capital.  
 
There have been many similar models of differentiated products and 
monopolistic competition in the literature, but the present one will allow us to consider 
inter-industry trade, intra-industry trade, and capital movement in a simple model.
5 
 
In country i, i = c, a, and r, there are 
m
i n  types of manufacturing goods and 
a
i n  
types of agricultural goods produced by monopolistically competitive firms, where 
m
i n  
                                                 
4 Agriculture includes the service sector. 
5 See Wong (1995, Chapter 6) for a survey and some discussion about trade and capital movement under 
monopolistic competition. Amiti’s model (Amiti, 1998) is close to ours but the present one considers four 
factors and allows international capital movement.   4
and 
a
i n  are determined endogenously. Country i is endowed with  i L  units of labor and 
i K  units of capital of its own type.  
 
Trade in commodities and capital movements exist among the countries. Before 
the China-ASEAN free trade area (FTA) is formed, all countries have positive tariffs on 
the goods imported from other countries. For simplicity, it is assumed that no capital 
flows from China or ASEAN to the ROW. This assumption is justified by the fact that 
actual capital from China and ASEAN to the rest of the world is insignificant and it is 
used to simplify the analysis. 
 
In order to allow for cross-hauling of capital between China and ASEAN, we 
take the Armington assumption for capital, and distinguish three different types of 
capital, capital from China, capital from ASEAN, and capital from the ROW. Firms in 
China and ASEAN require all three types of capital in their production while firms in 
the ROW use capital from the ROW only. 
 
Currently, country i imposes a non-prohibitive tariff of ad valorem rate of 
h
ij t  on 
the goods in sector h imported from country j, and an income tax rate of  ij τ on the capital 
from country j, i, j = c, a, r, , ij ≠  and h = m, a. In equilibrium, the price of variety s of 
good h in country i is related to the corresponding price in country j by 
  (1 ).
hs hs
ij j ij qp t =+  (1) 
Thus 
hs
ij q  is the price of variety s of good h from country j the consumers and producers 
in country i are facing. Similarly, if capital flows from country i to country j, in 
equilibrium, the rental rate of capital in country i is equal to the after-tax rental rate in 
country j, for i = c, a, r, j = c, a, and ij ≠ : 
  (1 ). ii ji ji rr τ = −  (2) 
Goods shipped from country j to country i is subject to a per unit transport cost of 
(1 ) ji g − , where 01 ji g < < , meaning that if one unit of a good leaves country j, (1 ) ji g −  
is used to pay for the transport cost so that only  ji g  unit arrives.
6 Capital movement 
from one country to another is costless. 
 
 
2.1  Preferences and Technologies 
 
We first describe the preferences and technology in China, as the other two countries 
have similar features. There are a large number of households with identical and 
homothetic preferences. The aggregate utility of the country can be represented by 
                                                 
6 For simplicity, we assume the same transport cost is needed for both types of goods shipped from 
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where 
hs
ci c  is China’s consumption of type s of good h from country i, i = a, r. Note that 
(1 ) /1
hh
cc σξ =−  is the elasticity of substitution of sector h in China. Because of the 
presence of transport costs, China actually imports 
hs
ci m  units of type s of good h from 
country i, but of each unit (1 ) ci g −  is spent on the transport costs and only  ci g  arrives 
China for consumption. Thus 
  .
hs hs
ci ci ci cm g =  (5) 
Let us now turn to the production side of the Chinese economy. Firms use labor 
and effective capital, K  , to produce each type of the goods. Technologies are identical 
for all firms in all countries. To produce type s of good j, a firm uses the production 
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  (6) 
where 
hs
c L  and 
hs
c K   are the labor and effective capital inputs, respectively, and  ,
h
c α   ,
h
c β  
h
c γ , and 
h
c δ  are positive parameters. Equation (6) shows that there is no factor 
substitution between labor and effective capital in the production process. The left-hand 
side of the function indicates the presence of economies of scale. Another feature of the 
production function is that all firms in each sector face the production function given by 
(6). The effective capital used by the firm producing variety s of good h in China, 
hs
c K  , 
is an index determined by a combination of the amounts of capital from different 
countries, and is given by 
 
1 () () () .
cc c c hs hs hs hs
cc c c a c r KKKK
φ µφ µ −− =   (7) 
The way the effective capital is defined is based on the Armington assumption 
(Armington, 1969) that capitals from different countries are not the same, and that all 
three different types of capital are essential in the production process (at least in China 
and ASEAN). This assumption implies cross-hauling of capital across countries, 
allowing us to examine the impacts of a change in income tax on capital movement. The 
effective capital of sector h for variety s of ASEAN can be defined in a similar way as 
 
1 () () () .
aa a a hs hs hs hs
aa c a a a r KKKK
φµ φ µ −− =   (8) 
We assume that there is no capital movement from China and ASEAN to ROW. Thus 
the effective capital of sector h of ROW can be defined as   6
 .
hs hs
rr r KK =   (9) 
Note that in terms of preferences and technologies, all the varieties in the same 
sector are symmetric. This implies that the firms will choose to produce the same output 
of each variety and the consumers will choose to consume the same quantity of each 
variety of the same good. Thus we can define 
hh s
ii cc = , 
hh s
ij ij mm = , 
hh s
ii X X = , 
hh s
ii p p = , 
and 
hh s
ij ij qq = , for  , , ij c =  a, r; h = m, a, and all varieties s.  
 
 
2.2  Utility and Profit Maximization 
 
The national income of China is equal to 
  , cc c c c c Yw Lr KT = ++  (10) 
where  c T  is international transfer China receives. Note that when some of the capital 
flows to ASEAN, in equilibrium the domestic rental rate is equal to the after-tax rental 
rate of China capital in ASEAN. In the present model, it is equal to the total tax revenue 
the government receives through tariffs and income taxes on capital from other 
countries, i.e., 
  [] ,
mm mm aa aa
cc j j j c j c j j j c j c j c j c j
j
Tt p n m t p n m r K τ =+ + ∑  (11) 
where 
h
j p  is the market price of good h in country j, and  ij r  is the rental rate of the 
capital from country j in country i. The tax rates and the tax revenue will be taken as 
given by all households. The tax revenue is distributed in a lump-sum way to all 
households. 
 
A representative household will choose an optimal basket of goods for 
consumption, taking the prices and income as given, to maximize its utility. The 
representative household will have an income equal to the national income, and with 
homothetic and identical preferences among households, the consumption of the 
representative household is the same as that of the economy. The maximization problem 
can be conceptually broken down in two stages. In the first stage, the economy chooses 
the two sub-utility indices to maximize the utility function as given by (3), taking the 
national income in (10) as given. In the second stage, the economy will choose the 
optimal consumption basket of each type of goods in order to maximize the 
corresponding sub-utility index as given by (4).  
 
In the first stage, the first-order conditions give  
 
mm m m m m m mm
cc c c c a c a c a r c r c r Y npc nqm nqm θ =+ + (12) 
 (1 ) ,
aa a a a a a a a
cc c c c a c a c a r c r c r Y npc nq m nqm θ −= + +  (13)   7
where the symmetry between the varieties of the same product in each country has been 
used. The right-hand sides of equations (12) and (13) represent the expenditures on the 
two groups of goods, manufacturing and agriculture.  
 
In stage 2, the representative household will maximize the sub-utility of each 
group of goods by choosing the right basket of that group of goods, taking either 





































where h = m, a. Substitute equations (14) and (15) into equations (12) and (13) to get the 































where i = a, r, h = m, a, 
m
cc ζ θ = , 1 ,
a
cc ζ θ = −  and 
 
11 (/ ) (/ ) .
hh
cc hh h h h h h h h
c c c a cc a c a r cc r c r pp n n p g q n p g q
σσ −− ⎡⎤ =+ + ⎣⎦   (18) 
Variable /
hh
cc p n   can be interpreted as the effective price of a variety of the local good h 
in China. By equations (16) and (17), the consumption demands are functions of 
commodity prices and the number of varieties of each good. 
  
We now turn to the maximization problem of a representative firm. The problem 
can also be solved in two hypothetic stages. In the first stage, the firm chooses the 
optimal inputs of labor and effective capital, taking all factor prices as given. In the 
second stage, the firms choose different types of capital to produce the optimal effective 
capital.  
 
To analyze the firm’s maximization problem, note that the cost of capital for the 
production of type s of good h is given by 
 ,
hhhh
cc c c c c a c a c u c r R rK rK rK =++  (19) 
where h = m, a, and the symmetry among the varieties of each good has been used. In 
the second stage, a firm will choose optimal inputs of capital by minimizing the cost of 
capital as given by (19), taking the effective capital, 
h
c K  , its dependent on different   8
types of capital as given by (7), and the rental rates of capital as given. The different 
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Equations (20) to (22) are combined to give the cost-minimizing cost of capital in sector 
h: 
 (,,, ) ,
hh h h















⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞
=⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ −− ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
  (24) 
which can be interpreted as the rental rate of the effective capital. 
 
In the first stage of profit maximization, the firm producing each type of good h 
maximizes the following profit function, taking factor prices and the production 
function (6) as given, by choosing the labor and effective capital inputs: 
 .
hh h h h
cc cc c c c p Xw L r K π =− −    (25) 
Substitute the production function in (6) into (25) to give 
 () () .
hh h h h hh h
cc c c c c c cc c p Xw r X πγ δ α β =−+ +   (26) 
The first-order condition of the profit-maximizing problem thus gives 
  ( ) /( 1).
hh h h
cc c c c c c c pw r γδ β σ σ = +−   (27) 
Equation (27) gives the relations between commodity prices and factor prices.  
 
Free entry and exit under monopolistic competition implies that firms earn zero 
profit in the long run. Setting  0,
h
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=  (29) 
Equation (29) shows that the equilibrium output of each type of good depends only on 
the values of the relevant parameters. The equation applies to ASEAN and the US as 
well. 
 
Equation (29) has a very useful implication: Because the production of each 
variety depends only on the relevant parameters but not on government policies, and 
because of the link between the output and inputs as given by the production function, 
the corresponding amounts of labor and effective capital employed by each firm will be 
independent of the policies of the governments. The labor and effective capital 
employment of each sector will then be determined by the number of varieties of the 
sector.  
 
2.3  Market Equilibrium 
 
 The equilibrium of the labor market in country i, i = c, a, r, is  
  () .
mmm aaa
ii i i i i i i Lnn σ αγα γ =+  (30) 
The right-hand side of equation (30) is the total demand for labor, where the symmetry 
between all types of goods in the same sector has been used. The equilibrium of the 
China capital market is described by the following equation: 
  .
aa mm aa mm
cc c cc c ca a ca a c Kn Kn Kn Kn K =+++   (31) 
In equation (31), the right-hand side represents the demand for capital in the two sectors 
of the three countries. Similarly, the equilibrium of the capital market in ASEAN is 
described by 
  ,
aa mm aa mm
ac c ac c aa a aa a a Kn Kn Kn Kn K =+++   (32) 
while that of the ROW capital market is 
  .
aa mm aa mm aa mm
rr rr r c c rc c ra a ra a r Kn Kn Kn Kn Kn Kn K =+++++   (33) 
The equilibrium of the market of type s of good h in China is given by 
 .
hh h h
cc a cr c X cmm =+ +  (34) 




3.  Simulation and the Benchmark 
 
3.1  Solving the System 
 
                                                 
7 The equilibrium condition of the capital market of ROW is redundant because of Walras’ Law.   10
The present three-country model can be described by following reduced-form equations: 
 
hh h h
cc a cr c X cmm =+ +  (35) 
 
hh h h
aa c ar a X cmm =+ +  (36) 
 
hh h h
rr c ra r X cmm =+ +  (37) 
 
aa mm aa mm
cc c cc c ca a ca a c Kn Kn Kn Kn K =+++   (38) 
 
aa mm aa mm
ac c ac c aa a aa a a Kn Kn Kn Kn K =+++   (39) 
  () .
mmm aaa
ii i i i i i Lnn σ αγα γ =+  (40) 
Each of equations (35) to (37) contains two equations, and (40) contains three equations. 
Together with (38) and (39), there are eleven equations. Note also that the equilibrium 
condition for the ROW capital market is dropped because of Walras’ Law. All the 
demands can be expressed as functions of factor prices, commodity prices, and tax rates, 
but commodity prices can in turn be expressed in terms of factor prices. Therefore 
equations (35) to (40) can all be expressed in terms of factor prices and numbers of 
varieties, with all tax rates treated as parameters. There are three wage rates and seven 
rental rates in the three countries. Equation (2), four of them, can be used to provide the 
links among the rental rates, and can be used to eliminate four rental rates. There are six 
unknown numbers of varieties in the countries. Thus there are twelve unknowns left, but 
one of them is chosen as a numeraire (having a value of one). When given the tariffs, 
income tax rates, the transport costs, factor endowments of the countries, and the 
assumed preference and technology parameters, the eleven equations are then solved for 
the eleven unknown variables. Once these variables are known, other endogenous 
variables can be solved using the equations described in the previous section. 
 
The present paper considers three sets of policy parameters and the 
corresponding three-country equilibria. A change in the policy parameters is due to (a) 
China’s accession to the WTO in January 2002; (b) the formation of a free trade area 
between China and ASEAN. Thus this paper focuses on the equilibria in the following 
situations: 
 
1.  The benchmark: pre-WTO and pre-FTA 
2.  Scenario 1: China’s WTO accession 
3.  Scenario 2: ASEAN-China FTA  
 
The benchmark is the one before China’s accession to the WTO and before the 
China-ASEAN FTA. Scenario 1 is the situation after China’s WTO accession but before 
the China-ASEAN FTA. Scenario 2 is the one after China’s WTO accession and China-
ASEAN FTA. 
 
China’s accession to the WTO leads to unilateral trade liberalization. It involves 
a reduction of the tariffs on goods from other countries and a change in its corporate tax 
policies. The formation of the China-ASEAN implies a mutual reduction of the tariffs   11
(down to zero) by these countries on the goods from other member countries of the FTA. 
We will solve for the equilibrium under each of these situations. A comparison between 
the benchmark and scenario 1 shows the impacts of unilateral trade liberalization while 
a comparison between scenario 1 and scenario 2 will show the effects of regional trade 
liberalization on the member countries and non-member countries. 
 
To solve for the equilibria, we try to use actual observed data as much as 
possible. The tariff rates and corporate tax rates in which of the situation are based on 
the announced policies of the countries. Some figures, such as factor endowments and 
national income, come from government publications or are the estimates done by 
others. The preference and technology parameters, including transport costs, are our 
estimates or assumptions. More details about the data sources, the assumptions, and the 
values of the parameters are given in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Table 1a presents the endowments of the countries. We use effective labor in the 
simulation. Effective labor of a country takes into account the human capital in the work 
force. We use the approach suggested in Duffy and Papageorgieu (2000), with careful 
consideration of different human capital in different countries. The table shows that 
China has the most number of workers, but ROW has the most effective labor, mainly 
because ROW has substantial amount of human capital. ROW also has the most 
physical capital. The capital-labor ratio is the highest in ROW but lowest in China. 
 
Table 1b presents the tariff rates imposed by the countries in different situations. 
We allow the possibility that each country imposes different tariff rates on different 
goods from the same country. When China joins the WTO, it reduces its tariff on 
manufacturing products from 11.3 percent to 9.1 percent, and that on agricultural 
products from 19.2 percent to 15.8 percent. ASEAN and ROW maintain the same tariff 
policies as before. When China and ASEAN form an FTA, they remove the tariffs on 
the goods from each other. 
 
The corporate tax rates of the countries are given in Table 1c. As China joins the 
WTO, due to harmonization of the tax systems, China actually raises its tax rates from 
15 percent to 33 percent.  
 
Tables 2a to 2c present the assumed transport costs, preference parameters, and 
technology parameters of the countries used in the simulation. These parameters are 
used in all simulation exercises below.  
 
 
3.2  The Benchmark 
 
To have a better understanding of the present model, we first present and analyze the 
benchmark. This is the situation before China becomes a member of the WTO and 
before China and FTA form a free trade area.  
   12
We substitute the values of the parameters described in Tables 1 and 2, including 
the post-WTO policy parameters, into the system of equations described in (35) to (40), 
and solve the system of equations using Mathematica. The results of the eleven 
unknown factor prices and number of varieties of the two goods in the three countries 
are used to determine other endogenous variables.  
 
Our analysis will focus on the trade and FDI relations among the countries and 
their welfare. Table 3a presents the flows of goods between any two pairs of countries. 
The export and import of each of the two types of goods of each country are presented 
in each of the three panels. Panel (i) shows that China is a good exporter (in a gross term 
and net term) of manufacturing, most of which goes to ROW. China also exports 
agriculture, but the table shows that China imports much more agriculture than its 
export. As a result, China is a net exporter of manufacturing but net importer of 
agriculture. Most of China’s foreign trade is with ROW. One more interesting thing is 
that while China has a trade surplus with ROW, it does have a small trade deficit with 
ASEAN. 
 
ASEAN has smaller trade volumes with other countries. It has a trade surplus of 
54.0 with other countries but a trade deficit in agriculture. It has about the same sizes of 
export to China and ROW, but it imports more manufacturing from China and more 
agriculture from ROW. As a result, ASEAN has a trade deficit in manufacturing with 
China but a trade deficit in agriculture with ROW.  
 
ROW is a big trading partner for China and ASEAN. Because of its size, it has 
much bigger volumes of trade. It is a net importer of manufacturing from the other two 
countries, but a net exporter of agriculture. This model captures the fact that ROW runs 
a big trade deficit in terms of manufacturing but has big strength in exporting agriculture. 
 
Table 3b shows the capital flows among the three countries. In panel (i), one can 
see that China is a big recipient of foreign capital, mostly from ROW, both in 
manufacturing and in agriculture sectors. China and ASEAN have mutual flows of 
capital, even in the same industry. However, the outflow of capital from China is 
insignificant. So between China and ASEAN, capital flows mainly in the direction to 
China. Panel (ii) shows a similar picture for ASEAN: big recipient of capital from ROW. 
ASEAN sends considerable amounts of capital (manufacturing and agriculture) to China, 
but none to ROW. Since ASEAN receives much capital from ROW, on the whole 
ASEAN is an important destination country for FDI. 
 
ROW is for sure the most important source of FDI. Recall that the present model 
assumes that no capital flows from ROW to other countries. As a result, capital flows 
from ROW to other countries. Because of its size, ROW naturally is a major source of 
FDI for China and ASEAN. 
 
In addition to the directions of movements of goods and capital, the possibility 
of intra-industry flows is equally important. Table 3c presents the indices of intra-  13
industry trade and capital flows. For each sector, the index of intra-industry trade or 












where  i E  is the export of sector i or capital inflow of one of the countries and  i M  is the 
import of sector i or capital outflow, i = m, a. To show the overall degree of intra-
industry trade and capital flow, the aggregate index of intra-industry trade or capital 
flow between two countries can be defined as 
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Note that the formula given in (42) has adjusted for the existence of trade balance.  
 
The indices of intra-industry trade and capital flows for different pairs of 
countries in the benchmark are presented in Table 3c. In terms of trade, China and 
ASEAN have a high degree of intra-industry trade in both manufacturing and 
agriculture sectors. This phenomenon is probably because of similar factor endowments 
of China and ASEAN. The trade between China and ROW is characterized more by 
inter-industry trade. The degree of intra-industry trade in manufacturing between 
ASEAN and ROW is also small, but the index for trade in agriculture between ASEAN 
and ROW is very high. The last row of Table 3c represents the aggregate indices of 
intra-industry trade: China and ASEAN have a high degree of intra-industry. The latter 
point is an important one, which has not drawn much attention. 
 
The last column of Table 3c presents the indices of intra-industry capital flow 
between China and ASEAN.
8 Note that because it is assumed that ROW receives no 
capital from China or ASEAN, the indices of intra-industry capital flows between ROW 
and China or ASEAN is zero. 
 
The table shows that the degree of intra-industry capital between China and 
ASEAN in either sector is positive but very small. That is because China receives 
considerable amount of capital from ASEAN but is not a major source of FDI. 
 
 
4.  Scenario 1: China’s WTO Accession 
 
In this section, we try to measure the impacts of China’s WTO accession on foreign 
trade, capital movement, and welfare. As China becomes a new member country of the 
                                                 
8 The present paper explains the co-existence of intra-industry trade and intra-industry capital flows by 
assuming monopolistic competition and regarding capital from different countries as different types of 
capital. Chan and Wong (2004) provide an alternative approach to intra-industry trade and intra-industry 
capital flows by focusing on the competition between oligopolistic firms.   14
WTO, it is committed to liberalizing its trade and FDI policies. Three major policy 
changes made by China can be summarized as follows: (a) China reduces its tariff rate 
on imported manufacturing from 11.3 percent to 9.1 percent and that on agriculture from 
19.2 percent to 15.8 percent; (b) China opens some domestic sectors to foreign direct 
investment; and (c) For the purpose of accounting harmonization, China eliminates 
certain advantages granted to foreign firms, resulting in an increase in the effective taxes 
on foreign capital from 15 percent to 33 percent in China. The changes in China’s trade 
and FDI policies are summarized by Tables 1b and 1c. Note that all other countries do 
not have any obligation to have corresponding changes in their trade and FDI policies. 
Therefore the tables show that ASEAN and ROW maintain the same policies as before 
China is admitted into this trade organization. 
 
In order to find the impacts of this unilateral trade liberalization by China, we 
solve the equilibrium represented by equations (35) to (40), using the new policy 
parameters given in Table 1b. The values of the endogenous variables in the set of 
equations are then used to determine all other endogenous variables of the model. 
 
Tables 4a and 4b presents the changes in the flows of commodities and capital 
among the three countries. There have been concerns that trade liberalization by China 
will greatly improve the competitiveness of its products in other countries. In particular, 
many people in the member countries of the ASEAN worry that their countries will lose 
out because China and ASEAN compete in similar markets and have similar 




To see the impacts of China’s unilateral trade liberalization on its foreign trade, 
we refer to Table 4a. It can be seen that the trade liberalization does lead to an increase 
in China’s imports, as expected. Our results show that the increase is very substantial; 
for example, there is an increase in China’s import of manufacturing and agriculture 
from ASEAN and ROW. The increase in import from ROW is even more significant—
55 percent. However, the increase in import causes a drop in domestic production of 
these products, causing a shift of the resources from the import competing sectors to the 
exportable sectors. As a result, China will experience in a rise in exports. This result is 
shown clearly in Table 4a: China exports of both manufacturing and agriculture jump 
unambiguously. The jump in the export of agriculture is even more impressive than that 
of manufacturing: 28 percent versus 7 percent. 
 
Not surprisingly, ASEAN benefits in terms of trade with China from China’s 
unilateral trade liberalization: Its exports of manufacturing and agriculture to China 
jump by 27 percent and 18 percent, respectively. At the same time, its imports from 
China also rise, especially in agriculture. On the whole, ASEAN can see substantial 
increases in trade with China under more liberalized trade.  
 
                                                 
9 For more discussion about these worries and an analysis of the validity of these worries, see Wong 
(2004).   15
ROW, as other countries facing a more liberalized China, will also benefit in 
terms of trade, especially in terms of export of manufacturing to China. The main reason 
probably is because there is a bigger gap between China’s capital-labor ratio and 
ROW’s capital-labor ratio than between China’s ratio and ASEAN’s ratio. In other 
words, ROW, being the most capital-abundant country (group of countries), will be able 
to significantly improve its export, especially its export of manufacturing, to China.  
 
More interesting is that China’s unilateral action encourages flows of 
commodities in all directions. This suggests that a country’s trade liberalization could 
lead to a more efficient allocation of its domestic resources, but also a more efficient 
allocation of resources in the world. As a result, world’s volume of trade goes up. 
 
One lesson suggested by our results is that while it is true that China’s WTO 
accession could improve the competitiveness of China’s products in the rest of the world, 
other countries could expect to export more to China. After all, China is not only a 
producer but also a consumer. 
 
The impacts of the present policy on international capital movements are 
presented in Table 4b. As noted above, China’s accession to the WTO involves not only 
reduction in trade restriction but also changes in corporate taxation policy. Due  to the 
need for accounting harmonization, China actually has to eliminate certain advantages 
granted to foreign firms, resulting in an increase in the effective taxes on foreign capital 
from 15 percent to 33 percent. Such a policy obviously has negative impacts on FDI. 
Table 4b shows that the flows of foreign capital in both sectors to China drop 
substantially. There are increases in outflow of capital in sector sectors from China. An 
interesting point is that while the percentage increase in the amount of capital outflow 
from China is huge, the absolute amount is in fact negligible because the amount of 
capital outflow was small to begin with.  
 
Probably the more important result of China’s WTO accession is that ROW 
increases significantly its investment in the ASEAN while lowering its investment in 
China. This investment diversion effect is contrary to what some people have been 
worrying about. The reason for this result is that China actually tries to take back the 
incentives it provided to foreign investors before its accession to the WTO. Investors, 
especially those in ROW, are then encouraged to invest more in ASEAN. Thus instead 
of losing foreign investment, as some people in ASEAN have predicted, ASEAN gains 
more investment from ROW. 
 
We now examine how intra-industry trade and capital flows may be affected. 
Table 4c presents the relevant indices, using equations (41) and (42). In order to show 
how the degrees of impacts, the table also gives the percentage changes from the 
corresponding values in the benchmark. One interesting phenomenon is that all the 
indices go up, meaning that the intra-industry trade and capital flows between any pair 
of countries are enhanced. While intra-industry trade between China and ASEAN, and 
that between ASEAN and ROW increase moderately, that between China and ROW   16
receives much bigger impacts. In general, intra-industry trade in manufacturing is much 
greater than that in agriculture, not surprisingly.  
 
Table 4c also shows the indices of intra-industry capital flows. The degree of 
intra-industry capital flows between China and ASEAN is small, since capital flows 
mostly from ASEAN and China. Up to now, China is not an important source of FDI. 
Although the indices of intra-industry capital flows between China and ROW is small, 
they show substantial percentage increases. 
 
The welfare impacts of China’s WTO accession are given in Table 5a, which 
shows the values of GNP and welfare of the countries in different scenarios. Welfare of 
each country is the utility of the representative household defined by (3). The table 
shows that China’s WTO accession benefits ASEAN but hurts China, while the utility 
of ROW drops marginally.  
 
Perhaps the more interesting result is that China may be hurt by its accession to 
the WTO. To see how this may happen, note that in the present model, the welfare of an 
economy can be affected by the following factors: 
 
(a) its national income 
 
(b) its terms of trade 
 
(c) the number of varieties of products for the consumers. 
 
Table 5a shows that China experiences an increase in its GNP due to its WTO 
accession. Table 5b presents the prices of the commodities of each country in their own 
countries. Basically, the present policy change of China causes an increase in all prices. 
However, all the prices in ASEAN and ROW rise more than the corresponding ones in 
China. This means that for China foreign products become relatively more expensive. 
This hurts the welfare of China. Table 5c shows the number of varieties of the products 
produced by the countries. The last column gives the total number of varieties, which is 
approximately an indication of the number of varieties enjoyed by the consumers.
10 The 
table shows that the consumers in the countries are facing a smaller number of varieties, 
and this tends to hurt them. As a result, we argue that because of its WTO accession, 
China is hurt mainly because of the deterioration of its terms of trade and a drop in the 
number of varieties of products, even though its GNP goes up. 
 
Lastly, let us examine the impacts of the policy on income distribution in various 
countries. Table 5d gives the domestic wage-rental ratio of the countries, i.e.,  / ii i wr , for 
i = c, a, and r. All these ratios increase as China becomes a new member of the WTO, 
implying that workers relatively to capitalists benefit. One possible reason is that as 
capital moves among the countries, it tends to improve the productivity of the workers.
                                                 
10 The total is the sum of all the varieties of both products. This means that the varieties of the products 
are treated equally. This may not be the same as how the consumers evaluate the products.   17
5.  Scenario 2: China-ASEAN FTA 
 
We now turn to the next scenario: China and ASEAN form a free trade area (FTA). The 
economic integration requires that both countries remove tariffs on goods from each 
other, while the tariffs on the goods from non-member countries remain unchanged. The 
corporate tax rates imposed by the member countries are assumed to stay as before. The 
new tariff and tax rates of the countries assumed in this scenario are listed in Tables 1b 
and 1c. Using these new policy parameters but keeping the previous exogenous variable 
parameters, the system of equations (35) to (40) is solved for the eleven unknowns. 
Other endogenous variables are then determined. 
 
We first examine the impacts of this FTA on the flows of commodities and 
capital in the world. Table 6a presents the new trade volumes of the countries after the 
formation of this FTA. It is clear from the table that the China-ASEAN FTA has a huge 
impacts on their mutual trade, apparently at the expense of the trade of each individual 
country with ROW. For example, China’s export of manufacturing and agriculture to 
ASEAN increase by 28 percent and 81 percent over the corresponding figures after 
China becomes a member of the WTO, respectively, while China’s corresponding 
imports from ASEAN rise by 41 percent and 79 percent, respectively. These increases 
come mainly from their trade with ROW. The table shows that ROW’s trade with China 
and ASEAN drop substantially. For example, its total exports to China and ASEAN of 
manufacturing and agriculture decrease by 5 and 4 percent, respectively, while its 
imports of manufacturing and agriculture from the two countries drop slightly and by 8 
percent, respectively. 
 
Such trade diversion is not surprising, as the reduction of trade restrictions will 
encourage trade between the two countries. However, the substantial increase in the 
intra-regional trade implies that much trade between China and ASEAN has been 
created. As a result, China’s total exports and imports all expand, and so do the total 
exports of ASEAN.  
 
The impacts of the FTA on capital movement are much less as compared with 
those on trade. For example, China will expect a drop in the FDI in the manufacturing 
and agriculture sectors from ASEAN by about 3 percent. Note that China remains to be 
a huge recipient of FDI. 
 
Another way to see how the countries get more inter-dependent as a result of the 
China-ASEAN FTA is to examine how intra-industry trade and capital may be affected. 
Table 6c presents the new indices of intra-industry trade and capital movement. For 
example, the indices of intra-industry trade between China and ASEAN in 
manufacturing and agriculture both increase.
11 This shows that the FTA will encourage 
intra-industry trade between China and ASEAN. The degree of intra-industry trade 
between China and ROW goes up slightly, but that between ASEAN and ROW falls, 
                                                 
11 The aggregate index of intra-industry trade between China and ASEAN drops slightly. Note that 
because of the adjustment for trade balance, the aggregate index is not a weighted average of the indices 
of intra-industry trade of the sectors.   18
both in terms of manufacturing, agriculture, and the aggregate. The degree of intra-




Table 5a presents the welfare impacts of the China-ASEAN FTA. It shows that 
China’s and ROW’s welfare levels drop slightly, while ASEAN turns out to the a big 
winner: China’s welfare falls by 0.2 percent, ROW’s by 0.4 percent, while ASEAN’s 
goes up by 3.5 percent. To examine why the welfare of the countries change in such 
ways, we first examine the national income levels of the countries. The interesting thing 
is the all three countries get a higher national income level after the FTA, and the 
increase in ASEAN’s national income is more substantial – by 4.9 percent.  
 
Table 5b shows the terms of trade of the countries. While all domestic prices of 
the commodities increase, those of manufacturing and agriculture in ASEAN rise 
significantly. As a result, both China and ROW experience deterioration of their terms 
of trade, i.e., the goods from ASEAN become more expensive to China and ROW. This 
turns out to be a significant negative factor for their welfare. 
 
Table 5c presents the changes in the number of varieties in the countries. It is 
shown that the numbers remain fairly constant, especially the total of varieties of the 
two goods. In the present exercise, we discover that the terms-of-trade effect is 
significant for the changes in welfare of countries. 
 
Lastly, let us examine the impacts of the regional integration on income 
distribution in the three countries. Table 5d gives the wage-rental ratio,  / ii i wr  of country 
i, after the formation of the China-ASEAN FTA, which can be compared with the 
previous values. The table shows that the FTA raises the wage-rental ratios of the 
countries. In other words, workers in all countries can benefit relatively to the capitalists 
from the such regional trade liberalization. One possible explanation to explain the 
change in the wage-rental ratio is that unilateral and regional trade liberalization allows 




6.  Concluding Remarks 
 
Trade liberalization is one main feature of the post-war world trade. Sometimes 
countries chose to liberalize trade and capital movement unilaterally. Unilateral actions 
are made because countries expect to get some rewards in return. Multilateral trade 
liberalization happens when a large group of countries remove trade restrictions 
simultaneously. Examples of successful multilateral trade liberalization are those during 
the rounds of trade talks organized by the GATT.
13 In addition to multilateralism, some 
                                                 
12 Again, intra-industry capital movement between either China or ASEAN and ROW is zero because of 
zero capital movement from China or ASEAN to ROW. 
13 The WTO is currently conducting the Doha round of trade negotiation.   19
countries form preferential trading clubs, imposing lower tariffs on the goods flowing 
within the club but keeping higher tariffs on goods from non-member countries. 
Examples of these preferential clubs are free trade areas (FTAs). Asia is a late comer in 
terms of forming free trade areas, but since the ASEAN decided to convert itself into an 
FTA in 1992, many countries in Asia had caught the fever of FTAs and are negotiating 
with other countries to expand their list of FTA partners. These several channels of trade 
liberalization have brought significant impacts to many countries. 
 
The present paper constructs a two-differentiated-product, three-country, four-
factor model. Using observed or assumed values of the countries’ factor endowments, 
preference parameters, and technology parameters, this paper simulates several 
equilibria, based on the trade policies of the countries. The equilibria provide a 
convenient way of performing several comparative-static exercises in order to 
investigate how unilateral and regional trade liberalization may affect trade, capital 
movement, income distribution, and welfare among the three countries in the present 
model. 
 
Two major features of the present model are the presence of international capital 
movements and the existence of differentiated products. The former feature is used to 
capture the rising importance of international capital movements and their roles in 
welfare and income distribution. The latter feature is used to bring out the importance of 
increasing returns and trade between China and ASEAN.  
 
The results obtained in this paper can be used to answer several questions 
concerning the impacts of unilateral and regional trade liberalization. For example, 
while some people in Asia have been worrying about the possible adverse effects of 
China’s WTO accession, our results show just the opposite possibility: ASEAN benefits 
from such a unilateral trade liberalization of China. One direct explanation of this result 
is the existence of rising trade and capital movement between China and ASEAN. 
 
While we have tried our best to rely on observed data to guess the values of 
some of the parameters, it is no doubt that the results obtained are at best some good 
guess of the impacts of trade liberalization. Further work should be done, including the 
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Basic Data and Assumptions 
 
Table 1a: Endowments of the Countries (1996-2000 Average) 
 
 China  ASEAN  ROW
6 
Labor,  i E
1  754 255 363 
Human Capital,  i H
2  5.21 5.07  10.33 
Effective Labor Coefficient,  i χ   0.18 0.19 0.68 
Effective Labor, 
i
ii i LH E
χ =
3  1014 347 1497 
Physical Capital,  i K   674 464  5107 
/ ii KL
5  0.66 1.34  3.1 
 
Notes and Sources:  
(1)  These are the labor force figures of the countries in 2002. For Malaysia (2001), 
Vietnam (2000), Cambodia (2000), the labor force figures are based on the 
corresponding figures in the years indicated and the assumption that the growth rates 
of the labor force were the same as their population growth rates. Brunei and Laos 
did not have any labor force figures. These countries labor force for year 2002 are 
estimated from their population figure by assuming that they have the same labor 
participation rate as the remaining ASEAN countries. Data for the ASEAN countries 
and China are from the Asian Development Bank Website (www.adb.org/statistics). 
Population data for Brunei, USA, France and Canada are taken from World Bank 
Website (http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html). However, 
the labor force data for all ROW countries is taken from International Labor 
Organization website (http://laborsta.ilo.org/). Figures are in millions of labor units. 
(2)  Human capital (average number of years of education) figures are for the year 1987 
and they are taken from Chris Papagerogieou’s Website 
http://www.bus.lsu.edu/economics/faculty/cpapageorgiou/personal/welcome.html). 
This data set was used in Duffy and Papagergieou (2000). Figures are in terms of 
average number of years of education units.  
(3) Duffy and Papageorgieu (2000) provided estimates of  i χ  for 82 countries. Following 
the paper,  i χ  estimate for low K/L countries is used for China. Their data samples 
include some ASEAN countries in both low and low-middle K/L groups. We used 
the average of those for the whole ASEAN countries.  High K/L countries’  i χ  
estimate is used for the all ROW countries except Japan. The parameter estimate for 
Japan is zero. 
(4)  Effective labor is the combination of population and human capital. Following Duffe 
and Papageorgieu (2002) effective capital is defined as 
i
ii i LH E
χ = . Figures are in 
millions of effective labor units. 
(5)  Capital stock estimates for a group of countries are given in Duffy and Papagergieou 
(2000) for years up to 1987   21
(http://www.bus.lsu.edu/economics/faculty/cpapageorgiou/personal/welcome.html).  
The figures are extended to year 2000 by using World Penn Tables real USD 
investment data (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt61_form.php). Capital is 
assumed to depreciate by 6% every year following the method described in Duffy 
and Papageorgieu (2000). There are few data regarding capital stock of the ASEAN 
economies available. The capital stock for the whole ASEAN is estimated by 
assuming that the K/L ratio of the countries with no data (Brunei, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar) are the same as the average K/L ratio of the ones 
with data (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Philippines). Figures are in 
ten billion USD units. 
(6) ROW includes the USA, Japan, Australia, Canada, UK, Italy, France, Germany, and 
Hong Kong.   22




  China ASEAN ROW 
country j 
m
cj t  
a
cj t  
m
aj t  
a
aj t  
m
rj t  
a
rj t  
China --  --  7.8  11.4  3.6  5.5 
ASEAN 11.3  19.2  --  --  3.6  5.5 
ROW 11.3  19.2  7.8  11.4  --  -- 
 
(ii) post WTO 
percent 
  China ASEAN ROW 
country j 
m
cj t  
a
cj t  
m
aj t  
a
aj t  
m
rj t  
a
rj t  
China --  --  7.8  11.4  3.6  5.5 
ASEAN 9.1  15.8  --  --  3.6  5.5 
ROW  9.1 15.8  7.8 11.4  --  -- 
 
 
(iii) post FTA 
percent 
  China ASEAN ROW 
country j 
m
cj t  
a
cj t  
m
aj t  
a
aj t  
m
rj t  
a
rj t  
China --  --  0  0  3.6  5.5 
ASEAN 0  0  --  --  3.6  5.5 
ROW  9.1 15.8  7.8 11.4  --  -- 
 
Notes and Sources:  
(1)  Benchmark tariffs for agriculture and non-agriculture products were taken from 
WTO website for year 2002 except for Malaysia (2001), Thailand (2001), Brunei 
(2001) and Philippines (2003) (http://stat.wto.org/)). The parameter for ASEAN is 
the GDP weighted average of individual member countries. ASEAN countries' 
GDPs are taken from the Asian Development Bank website for the year 2002 
(http://www.adb.org/statistics). The ASEAN figure does not include Myanmar and 
Laos due to lack of data.  
(2) Post WTO data represent maximum tariff commitment of China in both Agriculture 
and others. 
(3) ROW includes the USA, Japan, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, and 
Hong Kong. Figures for ROW are GDP weighted averages of individual figures.   23




 country k 
China
1 
ck τ  
ASEAN
2 
ak τ  
ROW
3 
rk τ  
China
  -- 28.7  38.3 
ASEAN 15  --  38.3 
ROW 15  28.7  -- 
 
 
(ii) post WTO 
percent 
 country k 
China
1 
ck τ  
ASEAN
2 
ak τ  
ROW
3 
rk τ  
China
  -- 28.7  38.3 
ASEAN 33  --  38.3 
ROW 33  28.7  -- 
 
 
(iii) post FTA 
percent 
 country k 
China
1 
ck τ  
ASEAN
2 
ak τ  
ROW
3 
rk τ  
China
  -- 28.7  38.3 
ASEAN 33  --  38.3 
ROW 33  28.7  -- 
 
Notes and Sources:  
(1) Following the reports by Price Waterhouse Cooper 
http://www.pwccn.com/home/eng/index.html) instead of statutory rate, preferential 
corporate tax rates for the special zones are used. However, the same reports also 
claim that preferential treatments of the foreign companies will end due to WTO 
harmonization. 
(2) GDP weighted average of six ASEAN members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam, and Philippines). 
(3) ROW includes the USA, Japan, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, and 
Hong Kong. Figures for ROW are GDP weighted averages of individual figures. 
(4) Corporate Tax rates are taken from the KPMG Website 
(http://www.kpmg.co.uk/pubs/taxrates_04.pdf) for year 2004.   24







cj g  
ASEAN
3 
aj g  
ROW
4 
rj g  
China
  -- 0.90  0.87 
ASEAN  0.90 -- 0.83 
ROW 0.85  0.83  -- 
 
Notes and Sources:  
 
(1) Variable  ij g  is defined in such a way that it represents the fraction of a good left for 
consumption after paying for the transportation cost. So the transportation cost is 
1. ij g −  
(2) Transportation costs between countries are computed by using distance between 
capital cities as a proxy (http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat-long.htm). 
Following Frankel (1997), estimation of transportation cost between China and USA 
is 16%. Transportation costs between ASEAN economies, USA and China are 
calculated by applying the formula 
  (, ) ( , ) 0.05 *0.11.
(China, USA)
Distance i j TCost i j
Distance
=+  
This formula assumes that transportation cost consists of two componenets: a fixed 
cost and a part that is a function of distance. If the distance between two countries is 
the same as the distance between China and USA, the formula gives 16% 
transportation costs. If the distance is greater, then the transportation cost increases 
less than proportionately due to the fixed cost term. Note also that Jakarta, Indonesia 
is chosen as a representative of the all ASEAN economies due to its size in terms of 
population and GDP. Considering that ASEAN economies are very localized 
compared to the countries/economies of ROW, this assumption did not change the 
result very much. 
(3)  ROW includes the USA, Japan, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, and 
Hong Kong. Figures for ROW are GDP weighted averages of individual figures.   25








  0.53 0.27 0.27 
m
i ξ   5/6 5/6 5/6 
m
i σ   6 6 6 
a
i ξ   5/6 5/6 5/6 
a
i σ   6 6 6 
 
Notes and Sources:  
(1) Variable  i θ  is calculated by using the share of industry and agriculture + services in 
total domestic expenditure. All the figures are for year 2003. Expenditure shares 
were taken from the CIA Factbook Online database 
(http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2012.html). The parameter for 
ASEAN is the GDP weighted average of individual members. ASEAN member 
country GDPs are taken from Asian Development Bank website for year 2002 
(except Myanmar fro 2001) (http://www.adb.org/statistics). ASEAN data excludes 
Brunei due to lack of data.  
(2)  1/(1 ).
hh
ii σ ξ =−   26
Table 2c: Technology Parameters 
 
(i) Industry m 
 






  2 2 2 
m
i β   1 1 1 
m
i γ   0.20 0.30 0.48 
m
i δ   0.33 1.22 2.37 
m
i φ   0.90 0.914  1 
m
i µ   0.007 0.0002  0 
 
 
(i) Industry a 
 






  2 2 2 
a
i β (1)  1 1 1 
a
i γ (2)  0.80 0.70 0.52 
a
i δ (3)  0.17 0.41 1.51 
m
i φ   0.90 0.914  1 
m
i µ   0.007 0.00017  0 
 
Notes and Sources:  
(1) The values of 
h
i α  and 
h
i β  are taken from Amiti (1998).   
(2) The values of parameters 
h
i γ  are obtained from the ratio of labor shares in the two 
industries and the ratio of production shares as follows:  






mm aa mm aa
ii ii ii ii i
ma a a a m m m
i i ii ii i i i
nX nX nX LL







This ratio gives us the ratio of labor intensity parameter if 
j
i α , 
j
i β , 
j
i δ  and the 
prices of capital and labor intensive goods are the same in both industries. After 
calculating this ratio, individual parameters for 
j
i γ  are solved for each country and 
each industry by using the fact that  1
am
ii γγ + = .  
(3) In order to estimate 
j
i δ  for these countries the distribution of the employment of 
effective capital need to be calculated. Unfortunately this data is not available and   27
we need to use some estimates. Sectoral distribution of FDI flows to ASEAN 
countries is available in the ASEAN secretariat website (http://www.aseansec.org) 
for the 1999-2003 period. For this period, the FDI shares of agriculture + services 
and industry are 48% and 52% respectively. The assumptions that parameters in the 
effective capital function are identical for different sectors (
am
ii φ φ =  and 
am
ii µ µ = ) , 
free flow of capital within the country, and identical corporate income taxes on 
foreign direct investments on different sectors simplify the estimation. These 
assumptions help us conclude that a sector’s share in total FDI will be equal to its 
share in total effective capital (including domestic capital). From the full 













δ = . Given the values for these parameters, we 
could calculate this parameter. Due to lack of data, Chinese data are assumed to 
have the same distribution of FDI in different sectors. The same parameters for the 
USA are calculated by using the distribution of fixed capital stock data (2002) 
provided by US Department of Commerce (http://www.bea.doc.gov). In the 
calculations, the fixed capital stock is classified as “agriculture+services” and 
industry categories. The shares of these sectors in the total capita stock (excluding 
real estate) are computed. 
(4) The total expenditure shares of domestic and foreign capital are calculated by using 
domestic and FDI stock estimates for the average in the 2000-2 period. The ratio of 
value of FDI stock to the domestic capital stock gives us the parameter for the 
foreign capital. In order to distinguish further the composition of FDI as Chinese (or 
ASEAN) and USA we calculate the share of Chinese direct investment in ASEAN in 
the total value of FDI in ASEAN. This figure is 0.2% for the 1995-2003 period. FDI 
and fixed capital investment figures are taken from the Asian Development Bank 
website (http://www.adb.org/statistics). Investment and FDI figures added 
successively in order to calculate the stock of capital.  6% depreciation rate is 
considered following Duffy and Papagiergeou (2000).  Some FDI data from the 
ASEAN Secretariat website (http://www.aseansec.org/home.htm) is also used in 
order to find the share of Chinese FDI in the total FDI to ASEAN.  
(5) ROW countries are the source of roughly 70% of the FDI to China and ASEAN. We 
assumed that all of the FDI flows are coming from these countries. 
(6) Capital stock estimate for a group of countries is given in Duffy and Papagergieou 
(2000) up to year 1987 
(http://www.bus.lsu.edu/economics/faculty/cpapageorgiou/personal/welcome.html).  
This data is extended to year 2000 by using World Penn Tables real USD investment 
data (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt61_form.php). Capital is assumed to 
depreciate by 6% every year following the method described in Duffy and 
Papageorgieu (2000). There are few data regarding capital stock of the ASEAN 
economies. Capital stock for the whole ASEAN is estimated by assuming that the 
K/L ratios of the countries with no data (Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and   28
Myanmar) are the same as the average K/L ratio of the ones with data (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Philippines). Figures are in ten billion USD 
units.   29
The Benchmark 
 




  export to    import from    balance
2 
  in M
1  in A
1  in M  in A    in M  in A  total 
ASEAN  251 175    170 268   81 –93 –12 
ROW  1288  479   171  1082   1117  –602  514 





  export to    import from    balance 
  in M  in A    in M  in A    in M  in A  total 
China  169.7 268.1    250.8 174.9    –81.0  93.2  12.2 
ROW  167.9 296.2    32.9 436.3    135.0  –140.0  –5.1 






export to    import from    balance 
  in M  in A    in M  in A    in M  in A  total 
China  170.7 1081.5  1287.5  479.1  –1116.8 602.4  –514.4 
ASEAN  32.9 436.3  167.9 296.2  –135.0 140.0  5.1 
Total  203.6 1517.8  1455.4  775.4  –1251.8 742.4  –509.4 
 
Notes: 
(1) M = manufacturing; A = agriculture. 
(2) balance = export – import 
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  capital outflow    capital inflow    balance
2 
  in M
1  in A
1  in M  in A    in M  in A  total 
ASEAN  0.00068  0.00615 19 6    19 6  25 
ROW  0.0  0.0 355 112    355 112 467 




  capital outflow    capital inflow    balance 
  in M  in A    in M  in A    in M  in A  total 
China  18.6 5.9 0.00631 0.00615 –18.6  –5.9  –24.5 
ROW  0.0  0.0  21.4 20.8 21.4 20.8 42.2 






capital outflow    capital inflow    balance 
  in M  in A    in M  in A    in M  in A  total 
China  354.7  112.5   0.0  0.0    –354.7 –112.5 –467.2 
ASEAN  21.4  20.8    0.0  0.0    –21.4 –20.8 –42.2 
Total  376.0  133.3   0.0  0.0    –376.0 –133.3 –509.4 
 
Notes: 
(1) M = manufacturing; A = agriculture. 
(2) balance = capital inflow – capital outflow.   31
Table 3c: Indices of Intra-industry Trade and Intra-industry Capital Flows 
 
 
  intra-industry trade    i-i K flows 
  C-A  C-R  A-R  C-A 
manufacturing 0.8074 0.2341 0.3275    0.0007 
agriculture  0.7897 0.6140 0.8088    0.0021 
total  0.7872 0.5189 0.7015    0.0004 
 
Notes: 
(1) C-A = China-ASEAN; C-R = China-ROW; A-R = ASEAN-ROW; 
(2) i-i = intra-industry; 
(3) For the formulas of the indices of intra-industry trade and intra-industry capital flow, 
see the text.   32
China’s WTO Accession 
 









1  in A
1 
 
in M  in A 
 
in M  in A  total 
ASEAN  282 (12)  222 (27) 216 (27) 317 (18) 66  –95  –29
ROW  1371 (7)  615 (28) 265 (55) 1261 (17) 1106  –647  460









1  in A
1 
 
in M  in A 
 
in M  in A  total 
China  216 (27)   317 (18)  282 (12)  222 (27)  –66  95  29 
ROW  185 (10)  342 (15)  47 (42)  491 (13)  138  –150  –12 









1  in A
1 
 
in M  in A 
 
in M  in A  total 
China  265 (55)  1261 (17) 1371 (7) 615 (28) –1106  647  –460
ASEAN  47 (42)  491 (13) 185 (10) 342 (15) –138  150  12




(1) M = manufacturing; A = agriculture. 
(2) balance = export – import 
(3) Numbers in parentheses represent the percentage changes from the corresponding 
values in the benchmark. 
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1  in A
1 
 
in M  in A 
 













ROW  0  0  302 (–15) 99 (–12) 302  99  401 


















1  in A
1 
 
in M  in A 
 

















ROW  0 (0)  0 (0)  24.7 (16) 22.8 (9) 24.7  22.8  47.5 









1  in A
1 
 
in M  in A 
 
in M  in A  total 
China  302 (–15)  99 (–12) 0 (0)  0 (0)  –302  –99  –401 
ASEAN  25 (16)  23 (9) 0 (0)  0 (0)  –25  –23  –47 
Total  326 (13)  122 (9) 0 (0)  0 (0)  –326  –122  –448 
 
Notes: 
(1) M = manufacturing; A = agriculture; 
(2) balance = capital inflow – capital outflow; 
(3) Numbers in parentheses represent the percentage changes from the corresponding 
values in the benchmark. 
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Table 4c: Indices of Intra-industry Trade and Capital Movement 
after China’s WTO Accession 
 
 
  intra-industry trade    i-i K flows 
  C-A  C-R  A-R  C-A 
manufacturing  0.8674 (7)  0.3238 (38)  0.4028 (23)    0.0009 (39) 
agriculture  0.8241 (4)  0.6553 (7)  0.8203 (1)    0.0026 (27) 
total  0.8218 (4)  0.5763 (11)  0.7217 (3)    0.0007 (72) 
 
Notes: 
(1) C-A = China-ASEAN; C-R = China-ROW; A-R = ASEAN-ROW; 
(2) i-i = intra-industry; 
(3) For the formulas of the indices of intra-industry trade and intra-industry capital flow, 
see the text. 
(4) Numbers in parentheses represent percentage changes in values from the 
corresponding ones before China’s WTO accession.   35
Table 5a: Welfare Impacts of Various Policies 
 
 
  China    ASEAN    ROW 
 
c GNP   c U    
a GNP   a U    
r GNP   r U  
benchmark 6668  2661    1448  682    7814  3945 
post WTO  7520  2652    1676  687    8983  3944 
change, %
1 (12.8) (–0.3)    (15.7) (0.7)    (15.0) (0.0) 
post FTA  7553  2647    1758  711    8998  3930 
change, %
2  (0.4)  (–0.2)    (4.9) (3.5)    (0.2) (–0.4) 
 
Notes: 
(1) percentage changes from the corresponding ones in the benchmark 
(2) percentage changes from the corresponding ones in the post-WTO case 






Table 5b: Terms of Trade 
 
  China    ASEAN    ROW 
  m
c p  
a
c p     m
a p  
a
a p     m
r p  
a
r p  
benchmark 3.98  3.09    3.61 2.80    3.89 2.94 
post WTO  4.43  3.53    4.05 3.26    4.34 3.43 
change, %
1 (11.3) (14.5)    (12.3) (16.6)    (11.6) (16.6) 
post FTA  4.44  3.56    4.20 3.43    4.34 3.43 
change, %
2  (0.2) (0.8)    (3.6) (5.2)    (0.1) (0.2) 
 
 Notes: 
(1) percentage changes from the corresponding ones in the benchmark 
(2) percentage changes from the corresponding ones in the post-WTO case. 
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Table 5c: Number of Varieties under Various Policies 
 
 
  China    ASEAN    ROW  
  m
c n  
a
c n     m
a n  
a
a n     m
r n  
a
r n   total 
benchmark  122.0 75.1    12.4 36.0    21.4  220.2  487.1 
post  WTO 119.1 75.9    13.0 35.7    26.6  215.3  485.6 
change, %
1 (-2.4)  (1.0)    (5.1) (-0.7)    (24.5) (-2.2)  (-0.3) 
post  FTA  119.1 75.9    13.1 35.7    8998  3930  3930 
change, %




(1) percentage changes from the corresponding ones in the benchmark 




Table 5d: Income Distribution under Various Policies 
 
  China ASEAN ROW 
benchmark 0.157  1.538  1.808 
post WTO  0.175  1.659  2.589 
post FTA  0.178  1.713  2.599 
 
Notes: 
(1) The numbers represent the domestic wage-rental ratios, i.e.,  / ii i wr , for i = c, a, and r. 
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China-ASEAN FTA 
 





export to    import from    balance
2 
  in M
1  in A
1   
in M  in A 
 
in M  in A  total 
ASEAN  360 (28)  403 (81)    303 (41)  567 (79)    57  –164  –107 
ROW  1389 (1)  605 (–2)    258 (–2)  1198 (–5)    1131  38  1169 









1  in A
1 
 
in M  in A 
 
in M  in A  total 
China  303 (41)  567 (79) 360 (28) 403 (81) –57  164  107
ROW  160 (–14)  271(–21) 38 (–19) 481 (–2) 122  –210  –88









1  in A
1 
 
in M  in A 
 
in M  in A  total 
China  258 (–2)  1198 (–5) 1389 (1) 605 (–2) –1131  593  –538
ASEAN  38 (–19)  481 (–2) 160 (–14) 271 (–21) –122  210  88
Total  296 (–5)  1679 (–4) 1549 (–0) 876 (–8) –1253  803  –450
 
Notes: 
(1) M = manufacturing; A = agriculture. 
(2) balance = export – import 
(3) Numbers in parentheses represent the percentage changes from the corresponding 
values in the post-WTO scenario. 
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1  in A
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in M  in A 
 













ROW  0  0  302 (0) 99 (0) 302  99  401 


















1  in A
1 
 
in M  in A 
 











–14 –5  –18 
ROW  0 (0)  0 (0)  26 (4) 23 (3) 26  23  49 









1  in A
1 
 
in M  in A 
 
in M  in A  total 
China  302 (–0)  99 (–0) 0 (0)  0 (0)  –302  –99  –401 
ASEAN  26 (4)  23 (3) 0 (0)  0 (0)  –26  –23  –49 
Total  327 (0)  122 (1) 0 (0)  0 (0)  –327  –122  –450 
 
Notes: 
(1) M = manufacturing; A = agriculture; 
(2) balance = capital inflow – capital outflow; 
(3) Numbers in parentheses represent the percentage changes from the corresponding 
values in the post-WTO scenario. 
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Table 6c: Indices of Intra-industry Trade and Capital Movement 
with the China-ASEAN FTA 
 
 
  intra-industry trade    i-i K flows 
  C-A  C-R  A-R  C-A 
manufacturing  0.9137 (5)  0.3136 (–3)  0.3839 (–5)    0.0010 (7) 
agriculture  0.8307 (1)  0.6711 (2)  0.7208 (–12)    0.0028 (7) 
total  0.8113 (–1)  0.5929 (3)  0.5954 (–17)    0.0007 (6) 
 
Notes: 
(1) C-A = China-ASEAN; C-R = China-ROW; A-R = ASEAN-ROW; 
(2) i-i = intra-industry; 
(3) For the formulas of the indices of intra-industry trade and intra-industry capital flow, 
see the text. 
(4) Numbers in parentheses represent percentage changes in values from the 
corresponding ones in the post-WTO scenario. 
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